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Abstract—Application developers often place executable asser-
tions – equipped with program-specific predicates – in their
system, targeting programming errors. However, these detec-
tors can detect data errors resulting from transient hardware
faults in main memory as well. But while an assertion reduces
silent data corruptions (SDCs) in the program state they check,
they add runtime to the target program that increases the
attack surface for the remaining state. This article outlines
an approach to find an optimal subset of assertions that
minimizes the SDC count, without the need to run fault-
injection experiments for every possible assertion subset.
1. Introduction
With continuously shrinking semiconductor structure
sizes and lower supply voltages, the per-device susceptibility
to transient hardware faults is on the rise. A class of counter-
measures with growing popularity is software-implemented
hardware fault tolerance (SIHFT), which avoids expensive
hardware mechanisms and can be applied application-specif-
ically. However, SIHFT can, against intuition, cause more
harm than good: its overhead in execution time and memory
space also increases the system’s figurative “attack surface”.
In consequence, this phenomenon can diminish all gains
from detected or corrected errors by the increased possibility
of being struck by radiation in the first place [1].
One class of SIHFT measures are executable assertions
capable of detecting data errors. These statements or code se-
quences check statically-known state invariants in specifically
chosen points of a workload at runtime, and “can detect
errors in input data and prevent error propagation” [2].
Although primarily used as a means to complement unit
tests – aiming at detecting programming errors during the
development process especially of safety-critical software,
– assertions can also detect data errors caused by hardware
faults, or even be specifically designed for this purpose.
While, for example, Hiller et al. [3] identify good
placements and adequate predicates for executable assertions,
we assume the target workload is already equipped with a
set of assertions. We explore the tradeoff between each
assertion’s capability to detect data errors, and its runtime
cost that increases the liveness of critical data in variables
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(b) Only assertion 2 compiled in: The runtime reduces
by d1, the total gray area is reduced compared to Fig. 1a.
Figure 1: Fault space of an example workload in two assertion
configurations: Gray areas denote SDCs, dark green areas
show faults detected by assertion 2, and light green indicates
detection by both assertions.
residing in memory during their execution. We also assume
that data errors may be detected by more than one assertion,
and aim at finding a subset of assertions – an assertion
configuration – that catches most errors but minimizes the
total silent data corruption (SDC) count.
2. The Attack-Surface Tradeoff
We assume a fault model of uniformly distributed,
independent and transient single-bit flips in main memory,
modeled as originating from direct influences of ionizing
radiation [4]. Under this assumption, live data stored in
a variable in memory has a corruption probability that is
proportional to its lifetime during the workload run and its
memory size [1] – or, in other words, proportional to its
area in a fault-space diagram.
The X-axis of the example diagram in Fig. 1a shows
the workload’s runtime, the Y-axis all bits in memory. In
the example, var2 holds live data throughout the complete
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runtime, and a fault-injection (FI) campaign injecting faults at
all possible time/memory-bit locations yields the information
that bit-flips in this variable during this time frame lead to
SDCs (color-coded gray). The gray-colored area contributes
to the total SDC count of the workload.
Error Detection and Additional Runtime. Similarly, var1
holds live data, but is checked against an application-specific
predicate by executable assertions 1 and 2 at runtime. Hence,
corruptions occurring in var1 before the point in time when
assertion 2 runs are detected (color-coded green). How-
ever, both assertions entail a runtime cost: The instructions
executed for each assertion extend the workload runtime
(by d1 respectively d2). Thereby, these assertions prevent
corruptions in var1 from causing an SDC, but increase the
lifetime of the data stored in var2 – which in turn enlarges
the grey-colored area, or the total SDC count.
In consequence, depending on each assertion’s balance
between SDC reduction (by turning otherwise gray SDC
areas into green detected results) and SDC increase (by
increasing the lifetime of other variables), it may influence
the workload’s total SDC count positively or negatively.
However, in the example in Fig. 1a, assertion 1 detects a
subset of the data errors in var1 that assertion 2 detects as
well. Thus, it seems advisable to generate a workload variant
without assertion 1, yielding a different fault-space diagram
(Fig. 1b) with a lower total runtime and, hence, a lower
(gray) SDC count originating from var2, but still most data
errors in var1 being detected by assertion 2.
Unfortunately, assertions cannot be considered indepen-
dently: Depending on the assertion configuration – i.e., other
assertions being compiled in or out of a specific workload
variant – an assertion may increase the fault-space area of a
protected (yielding green detected results) or an unprotected
variable (gray SDC results). This interdependency makes it
necessary to consider the total SDC count resulting from
every possible assertion configuration.
Approach: FI-based Result Calculation. Considering real-
world workloads with the number of N different executable
assertions in the hundreds or thousands makes clear, that
generating a workload variant for each of the 2N possible
assertion configurations is generally infeasible. Running an
FI campaign measuring the total SDC count for each of
these workload variants even exponentiates this problem.
Instead, our approach is based on FI results from a single
workload variant with all assertions enabled. We exhaustively
scan the single-bit flip fault space of this workload (using
advanced pruning methods within the FAIL* FI tool [5]) and
record a result – for example, No Effect or SDC – for each
fault-space coordinate. If an FI experiment observes that one
of the assertions detected a data error, we do not abort the
experiment and record detected (green in Fig. 1), but record
which assertion triggered and let the experiment continue
running. So, for example, an FI experiment injecting in
var1 at some point in time before assertion 1 runs (Fig. 1a)
would record assertion 1 to have detected the error, continue
running, then also record assertion 2, and finally record that
an SDC occurred – because it would have occurred if none
of the two assertions had been in place.
Based on this result data, our DETOx tool prototype
can calculate the SDC count for an arbitrary assertion
configuration. Removing, e.g., assertion 2 from the example
in Fig. 1a requires 1) subtracting all gray SDC areas between
t2,1 and t2,2 from the total SDC count, and 2) “re-dyeing”
all remaining areas that were only detected by assertion 2
to the final result recorded in the FI experiments.
3. Sorting Example
Using our approach we evaluated the configurations of a
simple sorting program taking 24 input elements with two
assertions: the first one checks for ascending order of two
swapped elements, while the second repeats the same test on
the complete array after sorting. The following table shows
the FI-obtained SDC count for the all-enabled (“11”) variant,
and the predicted results for all other configurations. Asser-
tion configurations are represented as a bit vector, where the
bits indicate whether either assertion was enabled/disabled.
00 01 10 11
SDCprediction 2 315 851 1 395 495 2 318 461 1 547 549
SDCreality 2 319 929 1 393 233 2 324 435
error -0.176 % +0.162 % -0.257 %
To quantify the prediction quality, we ran FI campaigns
for all other configurations besides “11” as a ground truth
for comparison – information that would usually not be
available, shown in the SDCreality row. In this example, the
SDC-count predictions are accurate to within 0.3%. The
optimal, lowest SDC-count configuration is “01”, i.e., only
the second assertion gets enabled.
4. Conclusions
To conclude, our approach allows for fast and cheap
exploration of the assertion-configuration space, and is
based on FI results of a single, all-enabled configuration.
This allows searching for optimal configurations in future
work, for example using genetic algorithms or optimization
techniques such as integer-linear programming.
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